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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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3 JUNE 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda


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3 June 1970
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W A R N I N G

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 25 - 31 MAY 1970

Moscow (3876 items)

Komsomol Congress	(6%)	28%
Indochina	(17%)	10%
[Cambodia	(5%)	5%]
China	(12%)	7%
Africa Freedom Day	(0.4%)	5%
Middle East	(8%)	4%
Upcoming Supreme	(8%)	4%
Soviet Elections		

Peking (3667 items)

Indochina	(78%)	82%
[Mao Statement	(42%)*	42%]*
[Cambodia	(24%)	33%]
[Vietnam	(9%)	3%]
Domestic Issues	(14%)	8%
Indonesian Communist	(3%)	2%
Party Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* Includes rebroadcasts of the Mao statement (slightly more than one-fifth of the figure this week, one-half last week) as well as comment in support of it.

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INDOCHINA

The publicity for Sihanouk's official visit to the DRV points up the strains in the communist world over policy on Cambodia. In his major speech at a Hanoi rally on 27 May, Sihanouk seemed to be hinting at Hanoi pressure on Moscow to recognize his government when he said the DRV "has placed at our disposal all its immense prestige and all its diplomatic talent to help us acquire the support of other socialist, progressive, and anti-imperialist people in the world." Moscow's minimal attention to the visit--in contrast to voluminous publicity from Peking and Hanoi--is typified by the brief TASS account of Sihanouk's speech: TASS says only that he discussed "friendship and militant solidarity" between the peoples of Cambodia and Vietnam and pledged that the Cambodians would fight on until victory.

Peking continues to devote more than three-fourths of its total radio comment to Cambodian developments, with the heaviest stress on Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement of support for the "revolution." Moscow, on the other hand, is broadcasting only a modest volume of comment which continues the dual lines of castigating Peking for its opposition to "united action" in support of Indochina and denouncing U.S. "expansion" of the Vietnam war. With its usual promptness in reacting to U.S. developments, Moscow reported President Nixon's meeting with his military advisers in San Clemente on 31 May as well as the announcement that he would report to the nation on the Indochina situation on 3 June. Moscow said that no "sensational" announcements were anticipated and that the President intended to repeat his "hypocritical assurances" and "former promises" that American troops will be withdrawn from Cambodia by 30 June.

Vietnamese communist media are silent on specific current military activity in Cambodia. But both Hanoi and the Liberation Front report on "victories" of the "Cambodian liberation forces" in early and mid-May. Attention to the fighting in South Vietnam includes laudatory comment on the attack on the city of Dalat, with Liberation Radio on 2 June calling for more exploits to commemorate the impending first anniversary of the founding of the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government on 6 June.

INDOCHINESE SOLIDARITY STRESSED DURING SIHANOUK VISIT TO DRV

The visit of Prince Sihanouk and his entourage to the DRV was highlighted on 27 May by a grand meeting where Sihanouk and Premier Pham Van Dong were the principal speakers. Other ceremonial functions

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included a banquet on the 26th, a "prayer for peace" at Hanoi's Quan Su Pagoda on the 27th, a visit to a textile mill on the 28th, and attendance that evening at a performance featuring songs Sihanouk had composed extolling Khmer-Vietnamese solidarity. Sihanouk also received a special delegation of South Vietnamese PLAF liberation combatants and heroes; he took note of that meeting in a message, dated the 28th, thanking PRG President Phat and NFLSV Chairman Tho for their message welcoming his visit. On 2 June VNA reported that Sihanouk "recently" visited the VPA's 61st missile battalion accompanied by Pham Van Dong, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, and VPA deputy chief of staff Phung The Tai.

The Hanoi press, according to the VNA press review, devotes considerable attention to the visit, with stress on the enthusiastic popular welcome accorded Sihanouk. Some local color on the Hanoi scene is noted in VNA's 27 May press review, which says NHAN DAN of that date carried a photograph showing "charming Hanoi girls in their flowery national 'Ao Dai' lining the distinguished guest's passage" at one of the welcoming ceremonies.

Sihanouk was effusive in his expression of thanks to the DRV for its support and in his stress on the solidarity of the Indochinese peoples. Speaking at the state banquet on the 26th--attended by President Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh--he expressed "profound and affectionate" gratitude for the DRV's "precious aid to our government and people." Describing the DRV as the "fatherland of the Indochinese resistance," he recalled that on 20 June 1965 Ho Chi Minh had said that "the Vietnamese people are standing firm on the eastern outpost of the socialist camp" and fighting in the frontline against the U.S. "imperialist aggressor."

In his speech at the grand rally on the 27th, Sihanouk also lauded North Vietnam's role in the Indochinese liberation struggle and went on to say that at present the DRV "is shouldering the heaviest burden of resistance against U.S. imperialist aggression." He expressed the Cambodian people's "deep and eternal gratitude" to the DRV and PRG-NFLSV for their "total and resolute support and important material assistance given without any conditions." And he cited the "helping hand" extended to him personally and to his cause by both Pham Van Dong and Chou En-lai after the 18 March "misfortune." Sihanouk recalled that in his speech at the banquet the day before he pointed out that he had given the Vietnamese people struggling to liberate the South "effective support and

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assistance" that was "not verbal," because "one cannot be neutral between the aggressor and the victim of aggression."

Pham Van Dong, speaking before Sihanouk at the meeting on the 27th, voiced the Vietnamese people's "deep gratitude" for the Cambodian people's "wholehearted support and assistance" in the Vietnamese anti-American struggle. He also praised the "militant solidarity of the three Indochinese peoples" as expressed at the recent summit conference. Pham Van Dong's discussion of recent events in Cambodia was standard in noting that the "U.S.-engineered" coup on 18 March, Sihanouk's 23 March appeal to arms, the growth and development of the Khmer "patriotic" forces, and President Nixon's 30 April decision to "invade" Cambodia at a time when the Lon Nol administration was allegedly collapsing. In addition, Dong remarked on the "unprecedented isolation" of the United States as a result of the military moves in Cambodia and on the "futile" nature of American efforts to legalize the Lon Nol regime through the "so-called Asian" conference on Cambodia held recently in Djakarta. He added that the situation is "more favorable than ever for the resistance" waged by the Vietnamese and Khmer peoples against the United States.

SIHANOUK CALLS FOR FURTHER RECOGNITIONS OF HIS "GOVERNMENT"

Sihanouk seemed to be hinting in his Hanoi rally speech on 27 May that the DRV may be pressuring Moscow and its allies to recognize his Royal Government of National Union. Once again listing and thanking the 19 regimes which have extended recognition, Sihanouk added that the DRV "has placed at our disposal all its immense prestige and all its diplomatic talent to help us acquire the support of other socialist, progressive, and anti-imperialist people in the world." He went on to express the conviction that these peoples and their leaders will give the Cambodians their supreme support--"that is, official recognition" of the Royal Government.

Hanoi radio's domestic service carried the complete recorded reportage of the rally, including the full texts of Pham Van Dong's and Sihanouk's speeches. However, the VNA account of Sihanouk's address omitted his remarks on recognition and on the DRV using its influence.

In tracing Cambodian developments in his speech at the rally, Pham Van Dong said Sihanouk's government has been recognized by a growing number of regimes as the "only legal, authentic government of

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Kampuchea." And in a later passage he said "we heartily acclaim" the Sihanouk government, "which is the sole, legitimate, and legal government of Cambodia."*

Soviet media continue to avoid any explicit reference to the Sihanouk government.** Most recently, this avoidance is pointed up in a resolution on U.S. "aggression" in Indochina passed by the 16th Komsomol congress. As carried by TASS on the 30th and published in PRAVDA the next day, the resolution welcomes only the formation of the National United Front of Cambodia (FUNK).

According to a Moscow-dated NCNA dispatch on the 29th, the Union of Cambodian Students in the USSR on 20 May issued an appeal to "all countries in the world cherishing peace and justice" to recognize the new Cambodian government.

CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, ICC ACTION DENOUNCED

Sihanouk's rally speech on the 27th, carried textually by NCNA as well as by Hanoi radio, asks rhetorically "how one can conceive that we will accept the terms of an enemy" to lay down arms without being defeated and to agree that an international conference "take charge of our country" and "legalize" the regime in Phnom Penh. In support of his opposition to a conference, Sihanouk went on to recall that Ho Chi Minh had said: "There are some people of good will who, deceived by U.S. propaganda, advised me to unconditionally negotiate with the aggressors. They did not understand that war would end immediately after withdrawal of U.S. troops." Sihanouk went on to quote Ho as expressing determination

* Similar language appeared in Pham Van Dong's 6 May message to Cambodian "premier" Penn Nouth extending DRV recognition. In his 18 May Hanoi speech commemorating Ho Chi Minh's birth anniversary, Dong avoided any explicit reference to DRV recognition when he said "the Cambodian people" had warmly welcomed the setting up of leading organs of the National United Front of Cambodia and the new government.

** The only known direct reference appeared in the brief 6 May TASS report of the proclamation of the government and of the FUNK political program.

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to go on fighting for five, 10, or 20 years if necessary.* The VNA account includes Sihanouk's remarks opposing a conference but does not include the Ho quotation.

Peking media originate no independent comment on the conference issue. But on the 30th NCNA carried Sihanouk's replies to questions from a UAR journalist, as reported by Sihanouk's private secretariat, in which he reiterated his opposition to a conference: A "new Geneva-type conference would only serve the interests of U.S. imperialism," and "the so-called pacifist powers or authorities which propose peace negotiations or conference on Indochina are sheer hypocrites" who attempt to help U.S. imperialism.

An NCNA commentary, also transmitted on the 30th, castigates Japanese action aimed at implementing the resolution of the Djakarta conference. It says that at a 27 May meeting of Japanese ambassadors to Southeast Asian countries with the Japanese foreign minister it was decided to send the Japanese vice foreign minister to New Delhi to consult with representatives of Malaysia and Indonesia and to "exert influence on the ICC, the cochairmen of the Geneva conference, and the United Nations." NCNA adds that Japanese, Indonesian, and Malaysian representatives at a 22 May Southeast Asian conference on economic development in Djakarta agreed on a meeting of "special envoys" in New Delhi on 10 and 11 June "in an attempt to reactivate the ICC."

MOSCOW CONTINUES TO ATTACK PRC ON "UNITED ACTION" ISSUE

Moscow continues its attacks on Peking's opposition to "united action" in Indochina. A participant in a 31 May domestic service roundtable discussion briefly notes that U.S. aggression in Cambodia is encouraged by the unceasing anti-Soviet campaign by the Mao group in Peking which demonstrates to the United States the "emptiness and hypocrisy" of Peking's slogans and appeals about "the necessity for a united front" against aggression in Indochina. The commentator complains that these appeals by Peking do not refer to the need for "united action by and cohesion of the socialist countries."

* This Ho statement appeared in an August 1966 interview with the French publication EVENEMENT, carried by VNA on 30 October that year. The remark came against the background of Hanoi propaganda in July 1966 scoring the Indian suggestion that the Geneva conference be reconvened. See the TRENDS of 2 November 1966, page 4.

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Moscow continues to score Mao's 20 May statement, with Mandarin-language commentaries on 27 and 30 May reiterating that Peking's actions do not accord with its words about a resolute struggle against imperialism. The 27 May commentary observes that the USSR and other socialist countries have provided the Indochinese people with moral and material support and that in mid-May the CP's of European capitalist countries resolved to strengthen support of the Indochinese. It recalls that the June 1969 CP conference in Moscow had called for unified action and that, more recently, the 14 May statement issued at the CEMA meeting in Warsaw had stressed the importance of action not words. The commentary on the 30th also cites the CEMA statement.

PHAM VAN DONG HAILS CEMA STATEMENT AS "COLLECTIVE SUPPORT"

Soviet, East German, and Bulgarian media have reported messages from Pham Van Dong expressing appreciation for the CEMA statement, but DRV media are not known to have mentioned them. The Dong message to Kosygin, reported by TASS on the 29th and frontpaged in PRAVDA on the 30th, called the statement a "resolute and timely collective support of the fraternal socialist countries" and thanked the USSR for its "invaluable support and extensive assistance." Similar messages to Stoph and Zhivkov are reported by East Berlin's ADN on 29 May and by Sofia radio on 1 June.

A Hanoi radio domestic service commentary on the 30th, in the course of rounding up worldwide support for Indochina in the wake of the U.S. "invasion" of Cambodia, lists in chronological order the 14 May CEMA statement, the 15 May statement from the Paris conference of CP parties from capitalist countries, and Mao's 20 May statement. As number four, the commentary lists demonstrations by U.S. students, beginning on 7 May.

MOSCOW SCORES SUHARTO U.S. VISIT, DJAKARTA CONFERENCE

Moscow acknowledges the visit to the United States of Indonesian President Suharto. Reporting his arrival on 26 May, TASS notes that the State Department announced that he would discuss "questions of regional security in Asia and economic problems" and cites U.S. press speculation that Cambodia would be discussed and that Washington expects Indonesia will supply Cambodia with at least symbolic military aid. Indonesian-language radio broadcasts on 26 and 30 May criticize Indonesia for calling the Djakarta conference of Asian states, asserting that Indonesia is "rapidly abandoning" its nonaligned and neutral policy, as shown by the fact that the conference was composed of "U.S. allies" and failed

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to denounce U.S. aggression in Cambodia. Commentators remark that the United States praised the Djakarta conference and would like to see Indonesia become a "genuine partner" in implementation of U.S. policies in Cambodia and Southeast Asia. A participant in the 31 May domestic service roundtable discussion does note that Suharto criticized the spread of the war to Cambodia, saying at a White House dinner that a widening of the war should be prevented by the withdrawal of "all foreign troops" from Cambodia. But another panelist adds that other aspects of the policies of Indonesia and other nonaligned countries such as Malaysia and Singapore nevertheless indicate they are giving the United States opportunities to pressure them to support American policies.

HANOI MEDIA GLOSS OVER DETAILS OF 28 MAY PARIS SESSION

Little of the substance of the 68th Paris session on 28 May appears in the VNA account, which the VNA press review on the 29th says is carried in "all" the papers; the LPA account is even shorter, and Liberation Radio for the second consecutive week was not heard to carry any report of the session. In standard fashion VNA glosses over the allied delegates' speeches, saying cryptically that GVN delegate Lam, speaking first, "argued for the blatant acts of aggression of the United States and tried to cover the utterly bellicose and traitorous features of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem junta." As for U.S. delegate Habib, VNA says that he "bragged about the U.S. 'good faith' in an attempt to cope with public opinion, which is widely condemning the Nixon Administration for expanding the war of aggression to the whole of Indochina."

The VNA account is more notable for its truncated report of the communist statements. It says that PRG deputy delegation head Dinh Ba Thi "pointed out that the Nixon Administration spoke of peace while continuing and stepping up the war of aggression," and it goes on to quote Thi on the statistical evidence of the "victories" by the "South Vietnamese" in Vietnam and "the Khmer people" in Cambodia since the 18 March removal of Prince Sihanouk. Specifically, VNA notes Thi's claims--prominent in propaganda during the past week--that the "Cambodian patriotic forces" put out of action 24,000 enemy troops, including 2,000 Americans, captured over 10,000 weapons, expanded the "liberated zones," and set up the "people's power" in many provinces, districts, and hundreds of villages in Cambodia. But VNA omits all of Thi's substantive repetitions regarding U.S. "aggression" against Cambodia and his claims that the pledge to withdraw by 30 June is "trickery." In this latter connection Thi alleged that the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "clique" has been told to play the "farce" of asking that the troops remain, and that the Saigon regime has been "ordered" to say the "puppet" troops will remain indefinitely.

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VNA's account of DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's statement notes that he too accused the Nixon Administration of intensifying the war in Vietnam, expanding it to Cambodia, and keeping the Paris talks at a standstill while professing a "'desire for peace'" and "'serious negotiations.'" The account further reports that Vy said if the Nixon Administration wants to end the war and attain an "honorable" political settlement, "there is no reason" why it should not respond to the "reasonable and logical" NFLSV 10-point solution, to the PRG proposal to completely and unconditionally withdraw its troops within six months, or to the PRG proposal for a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam, and there is no reason to downgrade and undermine the Paris talks.

But VNA does not indicate that Vy went about systematically to document alleged U.S. lack of good faith and escalation. Vy again mentioned former Defense Secretary Clifford's article in LIFE, saying that Clifford "had to admit" that the Vietnamization policy which Nixon called a plan for peace was in fact a formula for perpetual war.* Vy also quoted former Vice President Humphrey as saying on 20 May that the President, in going into Cambodia, had made a military decision without due regard to the consequences in the United States and abroad, that the U.S. troops are in Cambodia "uninvited and in open aggression, and that there is no evidence that it is going to shorten the war." The DRV delegate also cited Ambassador Averell Harriman, former chief delegate at the bilateral U.S.-DRV talks, as telling a congressional committee that "Nixon's peace plan" is based on the idea that military blows can force the communist side to negotiate on U.S. terms but that "all our past experience in Vietnam shows this is delusion."

VNA also omits Vy's charge that U.S. statements about peace and serious negotiations are contradicted by "continued acts of war" and violations of DRV sovereignty and security "which seriously jeopardize the Paris conference." The VNA account does say, however, that Vy in his additional remarks "severely condemned" the United States for sending aircraft, including B-52's, to bomb and strafe areas of the Vinh Linh zone and Quang Binh Province on 24-25 May.

* The VNA account of the 21 May session also failed to report Vy's reference to the Clifford article. But it had been mentioned in a Hanoi domestic service news item on 18 May. The only known reference to the article since then comes in a 30 May Hanoi radio commentary rounding up U.S. dissent to U.S. policies in Indochina. It quotes Clifford as saying that "I cannot keep silent in the face of Nixon's reckless decision to send troops to Cambodia to continue a process of action which in my opinion, is disastrous"

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Vy's castigations of "escalation" in Laos--the sending of Thai "mercenaries," and incursions by U.S. and GVN ground troops--and the "aggression" against Cambodia also go unreported. Regarding the latter, Vy said that the United States did not keep to the "space limit" in Cambodia and that the Nixon Administration is preparing public opinion for a "prolonged occupation by U.S.-commanded Saigon troops and prolonged U.S. air and logistics support in Cambodia beyond the deadline of 30 June 1970."

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS ALLEGED B-52 BOMBING OF DMZ

Alleged B-52 bombings of the northern part of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) during the last week in May are protested in statements by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 27 and 30 May. The statements on the 27th, as carried by VNA, charges that on 24 and 25 May the United States sent "46 flights of aircraft and many flights" of B-52's which bombed Huong Lap village in the northern part of the DMZ. The statement also claims that the United States at the same time "repeatedly sent aircraft to bomb and strafe" Vinh Giang and Vinh Quang villages in Vinh Linh area and several places in the western part of Quang Binh Province.

The spokesman's statement on the 30th claims that on 26, 27, and 29 May "a large number" of U.S. aircraft including B-52 bombers were dispatched to continue the bombing of Huong Lap village and that artillery attacks were launched from positions south of the DMZ and from the sea against Vinh Son, Vinh Giang, Vinh Quang, and Vinh Thanh villages situated in the northern part of the DMZ. It says that the alleged bombings and artillery attacks "at random have caused damages in human lives and property to the local people." Both statements routinely note that the DRV Government denounces and condemns these actions which "encroach on the sovereignty and security" of the DRV.

On the 31st Hanoi radio claims that a U.S. unmanned plane was downed that day over Ha Tinh Province. U.S. downed aircraft now total 3,352, according to Hanoi.

COMMUNIQES SCORE "WAR CRIMES" IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

ACTION IN THE NORTH A "war crimes" communique released by VNA on 2 June lists the alleged U.S. air strikes protested in the current foreign ministry spokesman's statements along with other U.S. "crimes" during May in both the North and the South. It scores U.S. air strikes "far inside" DRV territory as a "flagrant

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violation" of the bombing halt agreement. Recalling the stepped-up air strikes in early May, the communique details only the attack on the 1st. It says that at the Le Ninh State Farm over 40 F-4's "attacked an area of 15 kilometers by 10 kilometers for nearly four hours on end, causing 34 casualties, among them 10 women and 14 children."

The communique goes on to claim that from 1 to 15 May "on 96 occasions U.S. tactical jets discharged over 2,000 demolition bombs and 199,200 orange-shaped pellet bombs, fired tens of rounds of rockets and 20-mm. shells on Nghe An, Quang Binh, and Vinh Linh." Spelling out the alleged attacks for each province, the communique charges that in Ha Tinh Province the Duc Tho district and Cam Xuyen district were "rocketed" and "bombed" on 19 May and 23 May respectively. In Quang Binh Province, charges the communique, "several populated regions" in Le Thuy district were bombed on the 24th. It goes on to note that the U.S. military spokesman in Saigon on 27 May disclosed that on 25 May two fighter-bombers assaulted a region in North Vietnam about 96 kilometers northwest of Dong-Hoi town.* Inexplicably, the communique does not discuss the incident other than to note the U.S. acknowledgment. The alleged attacks spelled out in the current foreign ministry protests are detailed in the communique's disclosure of action against Vinh Linh area.

ACTION IN THE SOUTH The DRV communique also charges that contrary to the President's withdrawal announcement that 150,000 more U.S. troops would be withdrawn from the South, additional troops were added. It scores "daily bombardments" by both tactical and B-52 aircraft and the Saigon Administration's "increased repression" of students, Buddhists, disabled veterans, and the press.

LPA on the 30th carried a 29 May communique issued by the South Vietnam War Crimes Commission denouncing allied attacks on populated areas since January. LPA carried the communique on the 30th. The most recent previous communique, on 3 April, condemned allied "crimes" in the first quarter of the year.

* The United States on 27 May had acknowledged that two F-4 fighter bombers had struck at gun positions 100 miles north of the DMZ on 25 May after the enemy fired on an unarmed reconnaissance plane.

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APRIL-MAY "VICTORIES," GUERRILLA ACTION IN VIETNAM HAILED

Attention to current action in the South includes a 30 May VNA report which cites Western reports in describing that day's attacks on Da Lat. The item mentions that the PLAF was in control of the Da Lat radio station for a brief period and after 15 hours was "still occupying key points in the city."

Victories during May are hailed, VNA claiming on the 1st that the PLAF wiped out 38,000 allied troops, including more than 6,000 American and "satellite" troops, and destroyed 400 aircraft and 700 military vehicles. Other propaganda reviews action during the past two months, with QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claiming--in an article published on the 30th, broadcast by Hanoi that day--that in Central Trung Bo attacks are "hitting hard" at pacification and Vietnamization and that 28,000 allies including 5,000 men of the "oppressive forces" were wiped out. NHAN DAN claims in an editorial on the 2d, summarized that day by VNA, that communist "victories" all over the South in the past two months have placed the pacification and Vietnamization programs into a "still more precarious position." The paper says that during this two-month period over 88,000 allied troops were wiped out, 50,000 in April and 38,000 in May.

The strategic role of the regional and guerrilla forces is outlined in a Front radio broadcast on 29 May claiming that one of their new exploits since the end of March has been maintenance of the masses' control and expansion of their areas of attack. This poses a problem for the regional forces, claims the broadcast, since they must be able to step up the offensive while still defending the results of the struggle. The broadcast routinely praises the coordination of these forces with the PLAF, noting that the guerrilla and regional forces have used good timing in promoting and organizing the masses to rise against the allies. The broadcast also says that another "noteworthy fact" is that the guerrilla movement in the past two months "has developed strongly even in areas where it previously was weak." An earlier Front broadcast on the 27th routinely reviews guerrilla attacks throughout the South, hailing their effects on pacification and Vietnamization.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING REMAINS ALOOF WHILE MOSCOW PRESSES POLEMICS

The recent pattern continues to hold in Sino-Soviet affairs, with Peking's polemics in abeyance while the Soviets sustain their polemical fire across a broad front. Peking's pretensions to world revolutionary leadership, drawing on propaganda capital accruing to Maoist doctrine from Indochinese developments, have not been accompanied by the strident anti-Soviet attacks which in recent years have marked its efforts to enhance Chinese and erode Soviet influence in Asia and the communist movement. Peking has initiated no new anti-Soviet attacks since its propaganda on May Day, though it occasionally uses the proxy of foreign party statements for polemical forays against the Soviets. Recently, for example, NCNA on 30 May reported a speech by Albanian leader Hoxha on the 28th denouncing the Kremlin leaders as traitors to Marxism-Leninism and accusing them of using military blackmail against Romania in an attempt to install a puppet regime there "as they did in Czechoslovakia."

An unusual reference in PRC media to the socialist camp--for the Chinese an ideologically loaded concept which faded from their political lexicon after the major policy debates of 1965--appeared in a Sihanouk speech in Hanoi carried textually by NCNA on 28 May. However, the reference was third-hand and five years old, consisting of a quotation from Ho Chi Minh dating back to June 1965. In a bitter sermon on Soviet iniquities delivered at the DRV embassy in September 1968 after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Chou En-lai had flatly dismissed the socialist camp as something "which once existed" but which had been "completely destroyed" by Moscow's policies.

In contrast to Peking's present posture, Moscow manifests its irritation at Chinese behavior in continued gratuitous sniping at the Chinese for failing to match their militant words with concrete deeds, as well as by a tendency in recent days to call attention to the border dispute. Most notably, an article by O. Borisov in IZVESTIYA on 28 May (morning edition) maliciously chides the Chinese for permitting Hong Kong to remain a colony and reminds the world that the colony services the U.S. military establishment in Vietnam. Charging that Peking issues only "paper threats" to imperialist powers, which continue to occupy

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Chinese territory in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, the article claims that the Chinese have waged a political campaign against the Soviets and "provoked bloody incidents" on the border while displaying "astonishing" patience toward the British colony of Hong Kong.*

Another reference to the border conflict, and one also linked to a slap at Peking's anti-imperialist pretensions, is contained in a 27 May domestic radio commentary on Chinese chauvinism which recalls last year's border clashes and alludes to Mao's recent statement on Cambodia as an "ultrarevolutionary" maneuver. The border dispute also figures in a LITERARY GAZETTE article by V. Zhukov on 27 May dealing with Japanese bridgebuilding efforts toward Peking. Linking Japanese claims on the northern territories and Chinese arguments on the Sino-Soviet border dispute, the article charges that territorial claims against the Soviets form the material out of which some elements would like to forge a Peking-Tokyo axis.

SOVIET BORDER
GUARDS DAY

That Moscow's current references to the border dispute primarily reflect annoyance at Peking's revolutionary posturing seems indicated by the nature of its observance of Border Guards Day on 28 May, an occasion which provides a comparison with the tense situation at this time last year. This year, as in 1969, the central press carried several articles by border guard officials, but last year's frequent references to the border clashes that had erupted that March are totally absent this time. In the only reference to the Sino-Soviet border dispute, the border guards chief, Col. Gen. P. Zyryanov, notes in his PRAVDA article that talks with the PRC on the border question "are continuing" and quotes Brezhnev as saying it is essential to reach a border agreement. Zyryanov observes in this connection that in recent years much has been done on the "demarcation and redemarcation" of various sectors of the frontier, mentioning the borders with Turkey and Iran as current cases in point. While ignoring the border clashes, in

* It seems unlikely that IZVESTIYA would be unaware of the historical association suggested by the article's linkage of the border dispute with Peking's toleration of Hong Kong's colonial status. The territorial question first surfaced as a result of Khrushchev's taunts, in December 1962, that the Chinese tolerated the colonial enclaves of Hong Kong and Macao in contrast to India's action in Goa. This drew a reply from the Chinese in March 1963 indicating that such questions as those of Hong Kong and Macao relate to "unequal treaties" and asking whether those raising questions of this kind intended to raise "all the questions of unequal treaties."

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contrast to last year's article in which he bitterly blamed the Chinese and sternly warned them, Zyryanov echoes his statement in the 1969 article in affirming that the Soviet borders were historically formed and rest on "unshakable" legal foundations.

Zyryanov gives what may be a hint of recent Soviet pressures to broaden the scope of Warsaw Pact obligations beyond the European framework, thereby laying the basis for using Pact forces against the Chinese. He observes that the "brothers-in-arms" of the socialist countries view the protection of their own respective borders as their international duty and consider these borders "an integral part" of the frontiers of the entire socialist community.

Two border guards officers who have been connected with the Peking talks, and who authored articles last year on this occasion, are not represented in print this time. They are the chief of staff, V. Matrosov, who was the original deputy head of the Soviet delegation at the talks, and his deputy, V. Gankovskiy, who replaced him at the talks.

Last year's clashes at Damanskiy (Chenpao) Island were recalled in a Moscow radio report on Border Guards Day that a monument to slain guards was unveiled that day in the nearby town of Iman. One of the participants in the fighting, a decorated Hero of the Soviet Union, was reported by TASS on 27 May as having addressed the Komsomol congress in Moscow. Without identifying his connection with the clashes, TASS quoted him as assuring the congress that the border guards' combat readiness is at an appropriately high level.

MONGOLIA While Peking remained silent on the occasion of the 10th anniversary on 31 May of the PRC-MPR treaty of friendship and mutual aid, both Moscow and Ulan Bator took the occasion to attack alleged Chinese territorial claims on the MPR and to renew charges of Chinese provocations against Moscow's Mongolian ally. Taking note of Peking's silence, a 31 May commentary in Mongolian over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress cited several historical references-- dating from a 1936 Mao interview with Edgar Snow--revealing that Mao harbors "black ambitions" against the MPR and that he intends "to recover the territory of the MPR and deprive it of its independence and sovereignty." In itemizing political, economic, and ideological provocations against the MPR--specifically recalling "provocative acts" in the Mongolian border area--the commentary accused the Maoists of trying to intimidate the MPR, which "will never yield to such threats and provocations."

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Terming the treaty "an important political document which determined the fundamentals of the mutual relations of our countries," a 1 June Ulan Bator commentary contends that although the MPR has "consistently adhered" to the principles and terms of the treaty, the Chinese leaders have "deviated from the main clauses" of the treaty in an effort to "impose upon us their great-power and chauvinistic claims." Charging "unilateral curtailment of trade and cultural relations, flagrant interference in internal affairs, and undermining of the principles of normal interstate relations," the commentary asserts flatly that it has "now become impossible" to implement the main clauses of the treaty.*

The Mongolians have seemed particularly insistent on putting on record their allegiance to the Soviets and their intransigence toward the Chinese. In the series of PRAVDA articles contributed by foreign party leaders to mark the Lenin centenary, only Tsedenbal along with Poland's Gomulka attacked the Chinese directly, and the Mongolian leader was the only leader of a socialist country besides Brezhnev to do so during speeches at the Moscow celebrations of the centenary. Moreover, the Mongolians went on record with an attack on Peking in a joint communique dated 30 March on Czechoslovak President Svoboda's visit.

* Soviet mentions of the Sino-Soviet treaty--whose anniversary neither side has observed for four years--have been phrased in such a way as to indicate that it has become inoperative. The most explicit statement to this effect appeared in a compendium of Soviet treaties published in the monthly journal INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in October 1967, which said the Chinese leaders' policy "has largely deprived" the treaty of its "meaning."

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MIDDLE EAST

TASS STATEMENT SAYS ISRAEL SEEKS TO ISOLATE LEBANON

Moscow sustains and formalizes its propaganda attacks on Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon with the release on 30 May of a TASS statement warning vaguely of "dangerous consequences for Israel itself above all" if its "adventurist" line continues. The TASS statement is the first on the Middle East crisis since 16 February, following the Israeli attack on the Egyptian metal works at Abu Zabel, and the first on Lebanon since October.*

The 30 May statement charges that "over the past two weeks" the Israeli military has "almost uninterruptedly" been staging armed "provocations" on the southern frontier of Lebanon which have resulted in extensive damage and civilian casualties. "As usual," TASS says, Tel Aviv has sought to justify these incursions as measures aimed at countering "some 'threat to Israel's security.'" The statement does not acknowledge that Israel has said they are aimed specifically at controlling Arab guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon, although earlier, routine Soviet propaganda had suggested that the operations of "Palestinian partisans" would be the Israeli "pretext for the next armed provocation."

The statement alleges that the Israeli actions are in fact spear-headed against Lebanon's territorial integrity and seek to spread Israel's "occupation" into that country and make Lebanon "come out of the all-Arab front and isolate it from the rest of the Arab world." A TASS dispatch later on the 30th, rounding up Arab and other foreign reactions to the statement, plays up the charge that the Israeli actions are aimed at isolating Lebanon.

The TASS statement routinely charges that Israel, with "support from external imperialist circles," has defied the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution on troop withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in June 1967. It asserts that if peace is to be established in the Middle East, Israel must be made to respect the UN Charter, end its "armed provocations," withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territories, and comply with the Security Council resolution and "other UN decisions." Podgornyy,

* See the TRENDS of 18 February 1970, pages 13-16, and 29 October 1969, pages 14-17, for background on these earlier statements.

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at a 29 May luncheon for Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, also demanded withdrawal of Israeli troops. The 31 May Soviet-Ethiopian communique endorses the November 1967 Security Council resolution and calls Israeli troop withdrawal an "indispensable condition" for a solution of the Middle East conflict.

POLISH PAPER REPORTS ON SOVIET PILOTS IN UAR

A rare admission in communist media that Soviet pilots are flying in the UAR appears in an article in the Polish ZYCIE WARSZAWY of 27 May. Entitled "Soviet Pilots Over the Nile," the article recalls Premier Kosygin's 4 May press conference remarks on Soviet military "advisers" as well as UAR spokesmen's statements on Soviet pilots.* It goes on to state that "even Israeli sources were forced to admit that none of the Soviet pilots had approached closer than 35 kilometers from the cease-fire line." But the very presence of these pilots, the article continues, "has been enough to make Israel abandon its deep bombing raids against military and civilian targets located deep in Egyptian territory." ZYCIE WARSZAWY concludes that the Soviet pilots are "a factor which is stabilizing the situation . . . , for they are playing the same role as the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet in a time of crisis."

* Kosygin's press conference remarks on military advisers and the background on Moscow's treatment of Soviet pilots in the UAR are discussed in the TRENDS of 6 May 1970, pages 21-22.

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N A T O

USSR ASSAILS NATO ON EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, FORCE CUT PROPOSAL

A moderate volume of Soviet comment on the 26-27 May NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Rome focuses on European security issues and alleged disunity among alliance members on this question. Echoing the long-standing line that the pressure of public opinion "forces" NATO to consider the Warsaw Pact proposal for an all-European conference on security, commentators conclude that the Rome session paid little more than "lip service" to the conference idea. A panelist in the 31 May domestic service roundtable, for example, said the authors of the meeting's communique were "forced to recognize the usefulness of the idea and then accompanied that recognition with all kinds of reservations on the need to study the question, on the need for multilateral meetings, and so on and so on."

A 28 May dispatch by TASS correspondent Lopatin expresses concern over the foreign ministers' "reservations" about a conference and the attempts to "drown" the proposal in "endless procedural questions." Lopatin takes note of disagreements at the meeting, concluding that due to the pressure by the "extreme 'Atlanticists,' and first of all pressure by the American delegation," the session's concluding documents "hardly reflected the separate constructive elements that were brought forth in the course of the discussions." One such "element" which "merited attention," Lopatin suggests, was that of the Italian foreign minister for "a stage-by-stage and rapid preparation" of a European security conference.

IZVESTIYA commentator Matveyev, in an article in that paper on the 29th, also points up the alleged disunity at the meeting over the conference proposal. Matveyev states that opponents of a conference had set the tone at earlier NATO meetings and had been instrumental in the adoption of decisions of "a negative nature." This time, he says, the opponents of a relaxation of tension in Europe ran up against much more serious opposition to their obstructionist efforts, and "this left its mark on the decisions adopted in Rome." Matveyev concludes, however, that the foreign ministers' adoption of a declaration on balanced force reductions, together with the communique's expression of readiness to hold preliminary talks on a European security conference, is "like an attempt to reach a certain compromise between those who would like to delay further advance along the path to a pan-European conference and those who support its convening in the near future."

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Matveyev observes that while it would appear that a step forward is being made, there is also an attempt "to put a spoke in the wheel" of preparations for a conference.

Matveyev does not take the occasion to repeat the long-standing propaganda line that NATO has sought to doom a conference in advance by overloading the agenda with such matters as force reduction and the German problem. A 2 June commentary for North American listeners, while not touching on the NATO force reduction proposal, suggests as agenda items for a European security conference those put forward by the Warsaw Pact last October--renunciation of the use of force or of threats to use it and the expansion of trade, economic, and other ties.

Various commentators, including Matveyev and Lopatin, play up French Foreign Minister Schumann's objections to the balanced force reduction proposal. Matveyev notes that Schumann did not sign the declaration and recalls that at previous NATO gatherings the French have refused to endorse such a proposal as an agenda item for a European security conference on the grounds that it is an interbloc matter. Matveyev goes on to state, as earlier propaganda had done, that balanced force reduction is a "disarmament" issue better discussed at Geneva than at a European security conference. A Koleshnichenko article in PRAVDA on the 31st, reviewed by TASS, says Schumann has observed that the proposal for balanced force reductions "is a 'tactical move' which is quite unacceptable for the socialist countries."

In RED STAR on 26 May, commentator Pustov cites a report in the New York TIMES that NATO is examining a proposal calling for a 30-percent cut in Soviet troop strength in central Europe and a 10-percent cut in U.S. force levels in Europe. Deriding the 30/10 ratio, Pustov concludes that the proposal for force cuts is an effort "to dull the peoples' watchfulness and to distract their attention from the dangerous plans underlying the aggressive bloc's policy and strategy."

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USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PRAGUE SHOWS SENSITIVITY TO BROADER COMMITMENT IN TREATY

Simultaneous Soviet and Czechoslovak ratification of the 6 May USSR-CSSR friendship treaty is marked by largely generalized propaganda from Moscow but by notable sensitivity in Prague to "Western" attention given to omission of the "in Europe" qualification from the pact's Article 10 committing the signatories to come to each other's defense in the event of enemy attack.*

Premier Strougal, recommending ratification of the treaty in a Federal Assembly speech on 28 May, said "our so-called friends, in particular in the West, have been anxiously warning that under [Article 10] the CSSR is bound to support the Soviet Union in the event of any conflict." Without directly mentioning the omission of the "in Europe" phrase, Strougal noted that "a formulation" like the one in the present treaty also appeared in pacts which Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had concluded "in past years with other socialist countries"--most notably the renewed pacts the USSR signed with Bulgaria and Hungary in 1967.

Strougal also took a swipe at "imperialist" charges that the new treaty constitutes "legalization of the so-called theory of limited sovereignty." PRACE had anticipated three weeks earlier, at the time of the treaty signing in Prague, that the clause on "defense of socialist gains" as an "internationalist" duty would be "the object of the strongest clamor of enemy propaganda."

CTK's summary of a RUDE PRAVO commentary on 30 May was entirely devoted to a defense of Article 10, describing Strougal's recollection of other treaties containing the same formulation as a "witty response" to "hostile propaganda." The commentary ridiculed Western observers who were treating Article 10 as though they were "discovering America" and echoed Strougal's insistence that the article is of crucial importance for Czechoslovakia's own security.

TASS' summary of Strougal's speech on the 28th omitted his discussion of Article 10. And where Strougal said the defense of socialist gains was not "a restriction of the sovereignty of a socialist state" but an expression of its sovereignty, TASS blandly quoted him to the effect that defense of socialist gains was "an expression of socialist internationalism."

* For an examination of the treaty and background on the "in Europe" phrase, see the 13 May TRENDS, pages 26-27.

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Gromyko and Ponomarev in speeches at the 27 May Supreme Soviet session considering ratification, as reported by PRAVDA the next day, steered clear of controversial aspects of the treaty, as did Podgornyy at the formal ratification ceremony on 1 June, attended also by Brezhnev and Kosygin. Moscow and Prague media briefly reported the formal ratification of the pact the same day by President Svoboda.

UNPRECEDENTED VILIFICATION ACCOMPANIES DUBCEK RETURN HOME

Prague media so far have not confirmed a report by the Ankara domestic service on 30 May that Czechoslovak Ambassador Alexander Dubcek had left for Prague that day. The report took note of rumors that the former CPCZ First Secretary, now "suspended" from the party, is to be finally expelled and also quoted CSSR Embassy officials to the effect that Dubcek has returned home to visit his ailing mother.

The current phase of Dubcek's denigration in Czechoslovakia has included, for the first time, the naming of Dubcek in the headline of a critical article in the central party press: A press review broadcast by Radio Prague in Czech and Slovak to citizens abroad on 21 May led off with the report that RUDE PRAVO that day carried an article entitled "The Birth and Fall of the So-called Dubcek Communist Party of Czechoslovakia." The press review appeared at the same time to indicate that the article did not yet signal the start of an unbridled assault on Dubcek by the central press, noting that the article had been "originally published by the North Bohemian regional daily PRUBOJ."

Since the middle of May Prague media have been exploiting--as an example of Dubcek's "opportunism"--the controversy stirred up by French Communist Party renegade Roger Garaudy's expose of the July 1968 Dubcek-Rochet talks.* The most ominous charge against Dubcek to date, taking bribes, is contained in an editorial by RUDE PRAVO Chief Editor Moc in the 30 May issue, the day of Dubcek's reported return to Prague. Moc charges that during the pre-January 1968 period "in the narrow circle of the chosen ones, Alexander Dubcek held second place"--apparently to Frantisek Kriegel--"in the regular reception of the notorious envelopes containing high financial appreciation of his activities" from former First Secretary and President Novotny. In charging Novotny with giving bribes and referring to "the unprincipled policy of the leadership of A. Novotny," the editorial also marks an apparent official shift toward relegation of Novotny to criminal status as well.

* For a discussion of this controversy see the following section of this TRENDS on the French Communist Party.

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Groundwork for the start of political trials was laid officially by Strougal in his speech on domestic affairs to the Federal Assembly on the 29th, the day after his speech recommending adoption of the USSR-CSSR treaty. Transparently indicting Dubcek, Strougal recalled that during the liberalization "acts against the internal and external interests of the socialist state were frequently prosecuted with indecision or even reluctance, indolently." He added that "to this day there are tendencies to judge criminal activity of an expressly political character as trivial criminal activity of a general character, and some cases of criminal activity are not prosecuted at all."

Liberal resistance to the "exchange of party cards"--in effect since January and aimed at removing Dubcek and his remaining followers from the CPCZ--has by no means been overcome, judging by the increasing frequency of regime complaints about it during the past month. A typical commentary, carried in the Prague domestic service on 2 June, assails "strong liberalistic tendencies in some districts" of the country on the part of some of the people conducting interviews in the card exchange. As a result of such "rightwing" influences in the interviewing boards, it adds, the Semily CPCZ district committee "declared null and void the interviews in 42 primary organizations."

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FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

OUSTED DISSIDENT AIRS EMBARRASSING PARTY ROLE IN CZECH EVENTS

French communist maverick Roger Garaudy's public documentation of charges that the French Communist Party (PCF) gave the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ) a document to be used against Dubcek appears to have caused the French communists acute embarrassment and to have revived the question of the implications of the Czechoslovak events for communism in Europe. The document, which consists of purported stenographic notes of a July 1968 meeting in Prague between French CP leader Waldeck Rochet and Dubcek, was only reluctantly published in the French party organ L'HUMANITE in truncated form (with several embarrassing references to Soviet pressures omitted) on 18 May of this year, after Garaudy announced that he would publish it in a dissident communist journal.

In both the L'HUMANITE version and in excerpts which LE MONDE of the 20th says were deleted from the document by the communist daily, Waldeck Rochet, although at the time ostensibly pressing for a negotiated settlement of the Czechoslovak crisis, emerges as an apparent emissary from the CPSU, presenting the Soviet propaganda view of the Prague Spring, calling on Dubcek to curb his reforms and thus openly interfering in the CPCZ's internal affairs.

What appears to be particularly damaging to the PCF's domestic image is an alleged admission by Waldeck Rochet that he shared some of the Soviet concerns about the "dangers" in Czechoslovakia posed by a free press and the activation of groups outside the CPCZ's control. This admission, coupled with the PCF's apparent complicity with the present Czechoslovak regime's efforts to stamp out the last vestiges of the Prague reform, stand in sharp contrast with the PCF's public posture on Czechoslovakia* and may well complicate the PCF's continuing efforts to form an alliance of leftist forces in France.

* Paris AFP reported on 19 April 1968 that the PCF Central Committee officially affirmed that "the decisions taken by Czechoslovak leaders should help strengthen socialism" and expressed hope for "the success" of the CPCZ and Dubcek. The PCF Politburo also subsequently expressed its "disapproval" of the intervention but has progressively muted it since then and accommodated itself to the "normalization" process in Prague. The "disapproval," however, remains on the record and is included in the theses of the PCF's 19th congress.

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A PCF Central Committee resolution announcing Garaudy's ouster from the party,* published in L'HUMANITE on 21 May, specifically interpreted the present "anticommunist campaign" against the party as an attempt to "hinder the alliance" of French leftwing forces. The Central Committee also thought it opportune to use the resolution to call for "unity" in the face of this "campaign" and to give a vote of "complete confidence" to Rochet, Marchais, and Fajon--central figures in the episode involving the CPCZ. The call for unity appeared to reflect fear that Garaudy's repeated attacks on the PCF leadership and the revelation of the unflattering role played by the party in Czechoslovak affairs may bring some of Garaudy's dissident PCF followers who share his views on Czechoslovakia into his camp. For Garaudy's central dispute with the party leadership has revolved around the proposition that the model of socialism the PCF must offer the French people is not the type that has been constructed by Moscow in Czechoslovakia.

GARAUDY EXPLOITS CZECHOSLOVAK CONSERVATIVE'S THANKS TO PCF

Garaudy seems to have set off the polemic by leveling the charge of PCF complicity with the CPCZ in a letter to the secretary of his party cell after it had voted to recommend his ouster from the party. In the letter, published in LE MONDE on 7 May, Garaudy repeated the central thesis of his writings that "the people must be told clearly: the socialism our party hopes to establish in France is not that which Brezhnev is today militarily imposing upon Czechoslovakia." He went on to maintain that the PCF leadership "cannot say that" since it gave the conservative Bilak-Indra group in Czechoslovakia "the elements of a dossier which made it possible to overwhelm Dubcek." Answering Garaudy's charge in an interview on Radio Europe I on the 11th, deputy party leader Marchais denied that the PCF gave the CPCZ "any document which could be used against any person in an eventual trial."

Apparently taking up the challenge, LE MONDE on 13 May carried excerpts of a 14 January 1970 Radio Brno recording of a speech in which CPCZ secretary Indra was quoted as expressing appreciation to the PCF for supplying notes on the meeting between Rochet and Dubcek in 1968. According to the LE MONDE version of the broadcast, Indra said he was "surprised" when he was given the notes by PCF Politburo member Fajon during a visit to Prague on 26 November 1969. The minutes of

* The resolution appeared to contain merely the final propaganda justification for ousting Garaudy from party ranks. Since the publication of his book "Le Grande Tournant du Socialisme" in October 1969, Garaudy has been repeatedly attacked by the PCF for his "anti-Soviet" and "revisionist" views. He was ousted from his Politburo post at the 19th party congress in February 1970.

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the meeting, he reportedly added, shed new light on the question of whether Dubcek was merely "incapable" or "something else." Radio Prague and RUDE PRAVO accounts of his speech contain no reference to the notes.

GARAUDY'S INTERVIEW In an interview on Radio Europe I on 15 May, reported in LE MONDE and LE FIGARO on the 16th, Garaudy took center stage to insist that the document did indeed exist, that it was passed to "the Bilak group" by Fajon, and that it was presently being used throughout Czechoslovak party organizations as ammunition for attacks on Dubcek. He went on to play the 14 January Radio Brno recording of Indra's thanks to the French comrades and announced that the text of the notes would be published in the dissident communist journal POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI.

L'HUMANITE'S RESPONSE Evidently hoping to blunt some of the impact of the notes and to persuade readers that it had nothing to hide, L'HUMANITE on 18 May itself published "the notes" taken during the Rochet-Dubcek talks. It took this action, the paper defensively pointed out, "to give the finishing stroke to the slanderous campaign started by Garaudy and organized by the media." Describing its version of the notes as "text," the paper added that they "do not contain any element which could be used against anyone in eventual trials." The communist organ, like Marchais previously, did not address itself to the question of whether or not the notes were given to the CPCZ.

FRENCH CP LEADER SHOWN AS APOLOGIST FOR SOVIET INTERPRETATION

A major reason for the PCF's reluctance to admit the existence of such "notes" is apparent in the L'HUMANITE version of the talks and the unfavorable light the conversations shed on Waldeck Rochet's view of the Prague liberalization. Although by his trip to Moscow a few days earlier and by his visit to Prague the French CP leader appeared to be trying to head off Soviet intervention and resolve the crisis by negotiation, in the talks with Dubcek recorded in the notes he emerges as an apologist for the Soviet view of the dangers involved in democratization.

According to the notes, Waldeck Rochet began by presenting the fears of his Soviet "comrades" that "a counterrevolutionary" situation had developed and that Dubcek had not taken "practical measures" to correct the matter. After warning Dubcek against breaking Prague's alliance with the Soviet Union (which Prague had never threatened to do), he allegedly added: "One understands that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries could not allow such a situation to be created."

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After Dubcek innocently asked whether he was expressing the ideas of the Soviets in the discussion, Rochet responded, according to L'HUMANITE's text, "that he was in no way charged to express the opinions the Soviets" and insisted that he went to Moscow "quite independently," but was quick to add that he was mentioning the Soviet views because they "count in the debate." He then went on to observe that "we also have fears" that the liberals might endanger socialism and to express his own specific concerns about the dangers of a free press and the platform advocated in the "2,000 Words"--a manifesto by a group of Czechoslovak intellectuals calling for radical liberalization and a prime target of Soviet attack.

In a spirited defense of his reform movement, the notes report Dubcek as denying that a counterrevolutionary situation had developed in Czechoslovakia, asking: "Are the millions of people who support us counterrevolutionaries?"

LE MONDE Without revealing how it came into possession of the
EXCERPTS notes, LE MONDE on 20 May carried what it said were
 portions of the document that had been deleted by
L'HUMANITE. The first concerned a discussion of Warsaw Pact
maneuvers in Czechoslovakia in which Dubcek purportedly expressed
great concern over the presence of Soviet forces. According to
the LE MONDE version, Dubcek stated that although the Soviets
repeatedly promised to leave, they did not live up to their
promises. In this context, he allegedly asked Rochet: "I ask
you, who deceived whom?" The second passage omitted by L'HUMANITE,
the paper said, concerned an expression by Dubcek of his comrades'
fears about going to Moscow for further talks which the Soviets
were apparently demanding.

LE MONDE also charged L'HUMANITE with having ignored a preface to
the notes contained in a version being circulated by the CPCZ
which claimed that the document helped destroy the "prefabricated
legend" that Dubcek was merely a good comrade not up to his job.
LE MONDE further quoted the preface as adding that the document
can help one understand "what kind of man he really was."

TREATMENT IN In apparent deference to PCF sensitivities, Prague
PRAGUE MEDIA media sought to play down the significance of the
 notes, while at the same time cautiously exploiting
them in propaganda on the continuing "normalization" process. An
article in the party organ RUDE PRAVO on 22 May described the
notes as merely a "customary record of talks that did not contain
anything new." It added that "we had more than ample evidence of
Dubcek's opportunism." An article the next day by RUDE PRAVO

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Chief Editor Moc, however, sought to use the additional "evidence" against Dubcek to denounce him. By raising the issue of the Dubcek-Rochet talks, Moc said, Garaudy "only multiplied in Czechoslovakia one of the many examples of hypocrisy, insincerity, and the limitations of Dubcek." He went on to add that Dubcek's attempts to refute the fears of "honest comrades" only presaged "an offensive by the right which by degrees paralyzed the party, the government and the economy, the whole state and society."

Obscuring the fact that the Czechoslovak CP organ was making public use of the document, L'HUMANITE on 25 May took "certain journalists" to task "for trying to use the notes as alleged 'proof' against certain members of the CPCZ leadership in 1968." The paper went on to repeat its standard line on the issue--that the notes consisted of "only well-known positions previously made public."

PRAVDA ASSAILS GARAUDY FOR OPPORTUNISM, REVISIONISM

Obviously sensitive to any renewed polemics over Czechoslovakia, Moscow has maintained a predictable silence on the "notes." It did, however, indirectly register chagrin over Garaudy's latest action by publishing two attacks on him in PRAVDA which coincided with the recent developments.

An article on 22 May welcomed the PCF's decision to oust Garaudy from party ranks and used the occasion to denounce him for falling into "the bog of opportunism and revisionism." Noting that Garaudy was virtually outside communist ranks before his ouster, PRAVDA added, in a veiled allusion to his present activities: "He has defected to the bourgeois camp together with his methods and his bags."

The second PRAVDA article, on the 28th, as reviewed by TASS, is devoted to denigrating Garaudy's book "Le Grande Tournant du Socialisme." In particular, it ridicules Garaudy's "camouflaged Trotskyite ideas" about new models of socialism in which there is "free, boundless democracy." Such ideas, PRAVDA concludes, merely open the road to "the creation of factions and groupings."

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ROMANIA, USSR, ALBANIA

MAURER, KOSYGIN "EXCHANGE VIEWS" ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

Romanian Premier Maurer's unheralded talks with Kosygin and Soviet economic officials in Moscow on 28 and 29 May do not appear to have resolved any of their major differences on CEMA. An uninformative TASS report on the 29th says that the "negotiations" passed in "a friendly and comradely atmosphere" and that the two sides "expressed satisfaction" with "the exchange of views" on further developing economic and scientific cooperation. The TASS report makes no mention of the CEMA international bank, which Romania declined to join at the recent Warsaw CEMA Council session.* The communique on the 12-14 May Warsaw session had called for stepped-up "socialist economic integration" under CEMA. Romania has repeatedly declared its willingness to improve economic "cooperation" with Moscow, but has apparently so far resisted Soviet efforts to integrate it into a supranational CEMA that would infringe on its rights to develop its own economy.

Evidently in line with Romania's avowed willingness to "cooperate" with the Soviet Union, a protocol on scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and Romania has been signed in Moscow which provides, according to TASS on 2 June, for "improved planning methods, control and organization of science and technology, and cooperation in other matters of mutual interest."

ALBANIAN LEADER ACCUSES MOSCOW OF PRESSURING ROMANIANS

Albanian party chief Hoxha, in a wide-ranging speech in Kukes on 28 May--coincident with Maurer's Moscow visit--accused the USSR of trying to "blackmail and subjugate" Romania. "Under the mask of the Warsaw Pact," he alleged, the Soviet Union wants to get its forces onto Romanian territory "and never withdraw them." He charged further that the Soviets are exerting "numerous economic" pressures on Romania and "want to integrate it into their own economy, to impose on it even their own bankrupt currency." In effect encouraging the Romanians to resist such pressures, Hoxha pledged that the Albanians would "always remain on the side of the fraternal Romanian people and will support them in their just struggle."

* Radio Moscow's recent broadcasts in Romanian have been emphasizing the importance of the results of the Warsaw CEMA session. A 31 May Radio Moscow broadcast to Romania, for example, stated that the measures taken at the meeting were designed to include closer contacts between CEMA planning organs and hailed the decision to set up the international investments bank, which it said will create vast possibilities for tightening multilateral ties.

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An editorial in ZERI I POPULLIT on 11 April 1969 had referred for the first time to a common bond linking Albania with the Romanians as well as with the Yugoslavs. The editorial also charged, as Hoxha does now, that Moscow was overtly pressuring the Romanians to hold maneuvers on their territory as a pretext for occupying their country. On 6 March 1970, ZERI I POPULLIT charged editorially that Moscow was trying to mold the Warsaw Pact forces into a supranational army as part of a scheme to dominate Eastern Europe, praised Bucharest for its resistance to Soviet "threats and blackmail," and pledged Albanian support for such "fully just" resistance.

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WEST GERMANY

EAST BERLIN STILL ADAMANT, MOSCOW RESTRAINED AFTER KASSEL

Followup commentaries in East German and Soviet media on the 21 May Kassel summit between GDR Premier Stoph and FRG Chancellor Brandt reflect the same divergences in public treatment of the Brandt government that have been evident since Brandt took office. GDR media lay heavy emphasis on the similarities between Brandt's policies and those of his predecessors and see little chance of accommodation. Soviet commentators still warn that it is too early to write off Brandt, while expressing impatience because he has not moved more boldly away from CDU/CSU policies. Both East Berlin and Moscow react negatively to Brandt's "20 points" first presented at Kassel, while reiterating stock demands for international recognition of the GDR.

BRANDT'S SED Central Committee Politburo member Honecker on 20 POINTS 20 May rejected Brandt's 20-point proposals in perhaps the most rigid and blunt statement by a GDR spokesman to date. Speaking at a Berlin sports congress, Honecker said, according to ADN, that Brandt's "20-point catalog" not only "precludes equal relations in international law" but constitutes a "rebuff to international law" and is "simply meant to throw sand into the eyes of the world public." Honecker described the proposals as "merely the presumptuous claim to sole representation upheld by all former Bonn governments, although paraphrased by altered ideas." On close inspection, he charged, the Brandt proposals seek "to subject the GDR to the tutelage" of the FRG through talk of "'unity of the nation' which does not exist" and "so-called 'special intra-German relations.'" Honecker appealed to West Germans to demand that their government "withdraw from its old revanchist position, which has no prospects in any respect," and adopt a position of "true realism."

Stressing continuity between Brandt's policy and that of his predecessors, East German media repeatedly suggest that he harbors dark designs against the GDR. Thus East Berlin television commentator Domdey on 28 May described Brandt as "continuing in a straight line the policy of Adenauer, Erhard, and Kiesinger" aimed at fusing West Europe into a federation led by a West German "financial oligarchy." He alleged that "the imperialist integration policy of Brandt and Scheel" is designed to intensify the concentration of capitalism, thereby weakening the socialist community and striving to "extricate socialist countries and, if possible, incorporate them in the Western NATO

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grouping." In a similar vein, the GDR weekly HORIZONT was reported by ADN on 27 May as charging that "like its predecessors," the Brandt government "wishes to keep a free hand for an attempt, at a time it thinks suitable, to subject the GDR to the state-monopoly Federal Republic without coming into conflict with international law, exporting counterrevolution as an 'internal German' affair, as it were."

Soviet comment on the 20 points, including a 27 May PRAVDA dispatch by Grigoryev, supports the GDR appraisal on the main points and continues to emphasize contradictions in Bonn policy. Grigoryev's dispatch says "close study" of the 20 points proves that "most of them contradict in practice Brandt's positive declarations, making them purposeless." Grigoryev's reference to Brandt's "positive declarations" is reinforced in other Moscow comment, in contrast to the total absence of such language in the current uncompromising East German references to Brandt. Thus Glazunov again told German listeners on 1 June that the Brandt-Scheel government's policy "includes realistic elements" but has not yet "rid itself of the ballast of the past," the same line used in early December 1969 following the Moscow meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders. And a 24 May PRAVDA Mikhaylov review cautioned after Kassel that it still "would be premature to make a final summing up of present Bonn policy," which remained "too contradictory." Mikhaylov added that the "antiwar mood" in the FRG itself and the general European aspiration for detente "show that there is every possible support for realistic steps toward peace and security."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

REMEDIES FOR EROSION-PLAGUED NORTH CAUCASUS DEBATED

Soviet agricultural leaders and scientists are engaged in a vigorous debate over the best way to protect the north Caucasus breadbasket from the increasing ravages of wind erosion. The problem is similar to that in the Kazakh and Siberian virgin lands in the mid-1960's: the land has become overworked and increasingly subject to wind erosion. Writing in PRAVDA on 23 May, veteran virgin-lands observer Yu. Chernichenko said that Stavropol and Krasnodar krais have suffered from spring duststorms in 14 of the last 25 years and that the north Caucasian soil has become so susceptible to wind erosion that in January-March 1970 "quite ordinary winds" produced duststorms.

As in the long and bitter virgin-lands debate, the need to keep the maximum amount of land in production to boost grain output is pitted against the need to take land out of production to protect it from overuse and from wind erosion. While this debate has been carried on in the north Caucasus for several years, the unusually severe duststorms in early 1969 have intensified the dispute.

The main spokesman on one side is A.I. Barayev, who urges adoption of the solutions applied in the Kazakh virgin lands--a change in farming techniques and removal of eroded land from production. Leading the opposition to Barayev are Krasnodar scientists, who argue that the erosion danger is not so serious as alleged and can be coped with by expansion of forest belts and injection of more chemical fertilizer. The growing seriousness of the problem is underlined by the fact that since late last year the country's top agricultural leaders (USSR Agriculture Minister V. V. Matskevich and the president and vice president of the Lenin Agricultural Academy, P. P. Lobanov and V. D. Pannikov) have forthrightly come out on Barayev's side, assailing those in the north Caucasus who refuse to change their farming techniques.

While the early 1969 duststorms were still ravaging the north Caucasus, Barayev published a PRAVDA article (9 March 1969) urging the adoption of his moldboardless plowing system in the north Caucasus. He had long favored this system, but until the early 1969 disaster his views had received little support--just as it took the 1963 Kazakh duststorms to persuade many authorities to accept his methods in the virgin lands. Barayev's proposals center on leaving stubble to hold the soil against the wind, utilizing strip farming, and allowing badly eroded land to lie fallow.

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The opposing spokesmen advocate primarily an expansion of forest belts. As agronomist G. Golovin wrote in the January 1970 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, in the southern and southeastern parts of European Russia for many years it has been felt that the "main struggle against wind and water erosion" should be conducted by establishing forest belts. But the recent duststorms, especially in 1969, showed that forest belts are not enough, Golovin said, so that the reliance on forest belts by research institutes in this zone was a "serious error" and "the recommendations which have proved themselves in the East" must be studied. In Barayev's opinion, according to Yu. Chernichenko in the 4 August 1969 PRAVDA, the role of forest belts in soil protection is "insignificant."

In the summer of 1969, Rostov scientists, shaken by the early 1969 storms, swallowed their pride and sent a delegation to visit Barayev. The group acknowledged that wind erosion has been "seriously restrained only in the virgin lands" and that not using Barayev's method means "losing time" and "exacerbating the disease" (Chernichenko, PRAVDA, 23 May). Even these convinced Rostov representatives warned, however, that "our Cossacks won't accept this system right away."

In late October 1969 the Lenin Agricultural Academy held a special session in Rostov to discuss the erosion threat, and a vigorous debate developed between Barayev and his foes, mainly the Kuban scientists. The director of the Kuban agricultural institute minimized the seriousness of duststorms and declared that "leaving stubble is more dangerous than duststorms" because it would encourage weeds (Chernichenko, PRAVDA, 23 May). He argued that present farming techniques are the only correct ones and that the sole improvements needed are expansion of forest belts and increased use of chemical fertilizer.

The top agricultural leaders at the Rostov session sided with Barayev. Agriculture Minister V. V. Matskevich assailed the Kuban scientists for doing little to work out an antierosion system, "even though about one million hectares of land in the kray is subject to wind erosion" (RURAL LIFE, 4 November 1969). The vice president of the Lenin Agricultural Academy, V. D. Pannikov, criticized the agricultural institutes of the north Caucasus, south Ukraine and lower Volga for "weakening attention to working out effective soil-protective systems of farming and recommending agrotechniques which only permit combating of weeds and do little to facilitate soil protection and moisture preservation" (RURAL LIFE, 4 November 1969). Pannikov declared that the duststorms had shown that the agro-techniques used at many farms are incorrect: good chernozem soil

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had been turned into easily blown dust by "many years of intensive, sometimes unjustified, plowing." Pannikov's speech urged the southern and southeastern regions to study Barayev's system (HERALD OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE, No. 2, 1970). The chief of the Agriculture Ministry's main administration on grain crops, I. I. Khoroshilov, in his speech declared that forest belts are not enough and that virgin-lands methods should be studied (ZEMLEDELIYE, No. 1, January 1970).

The pressure on the north Caucasians has continued. In December, at a meeting of the RSFSR Agriculture Ministry's collegium on the situation in Stavropol, RSFSR Agriculture Minister L. Ya. Florentyev declared that the lessons of 1969 indicated that the entire system of cultivation must be altered (Radio Moscow, 11 December). In March 1970, Lenin Agricultural Academy President P. P. Lobanov, addressing a Krasnodar meeting on erosion, warned that wind erosion costs the kray one million tons of grain a year. Chernichenko, in his 23 May PRAVDA article, observed that at this Krasnodar meeting the only speaker to mention moldboardless plowing was the guest from Moscow, Lobanov. Chernichenko also noted that at an early April seminar the director of the Stavropol agricultural institute demanded a change in techniques, arguing that a "sword of Damocles" is hanging over the area and that it is a choice between "losing something" by changing to strip farming and "losing everything" by not changing.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEDIA INDICATE CONCERN OVER ECONOMIC COORDINATION PROBLEMS

Chinese Communist propagandists indicate increasing concern over the problem of coordinating the activities of the thousands of local industries whose growth has been encouraged by Peking since the cultural revolution. While Shanghai has long shown some sensitivity in this area, a result of its special economic interdependence with the rest of the country as a prime consumer of raw materials and supplier of industrial products, central media have seldom discussed the problem.

Now, however, NCNA has transmitted (29 May) an article by the writing group of the Honan Provincial Revolutionary Committee that faces up to the problem with reasonable frankness, calling for "unified leadership by the central authorities and management by local authorities, . . . coordinating the activities of the nation as in a chess game." While the necessity of developing small, local industries is never called into doubt (they are "reinforcements to the industrial front," help consolidate the worker-peasant alliance, and are necessary to achieve "national geographical distribution of industry and to strengthen preparedness against war"), there are said to be still "some comrades" on the local level who have failed to gear the new industries completely to their intended purpose of supporting agriculture. Another defect said to merit attention is "the tendency to exploit various social relations . . . to obtain machines, equipment, and materials through back doors or loopholes." Such activity has "an adverse impact on the state plan," diverting raw materials from the intended industrial consumer.

Shanghai continues to sound the "chessboard" theme with a commentary broadcast on 20 May calling for a unified plan under which each enterprise would consider the overall situation. "Certain units" are said to have been "corrupted by small-group mentality," with leaders who "make plans centered around their own local area" and ask advice from higher levels only when they want aid. The commentary declares that, just as in chess each move must be coordinated with many other moves, each enterprise must "not only fulfill early the tasks stipulated in the state plans," but must energetically coordinate with other enterprises whose needs are also part of the state plans.

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Interprovincial trade and cooperation is one aspect of the coordination problem noted in recent PRC broadcasts. A Fukien provincial meeting on warehouse inventories, reported in a 19 May Foochow broadcast, focused on the problem of getting stored goods out to the proper customers. Distribution to other provinces was not even mentioned in a list that extended down to supplying small lathes to units below the county level, while another section of the report specified that "in the disposal of production equipment, main emphasis should be on the needs of the province; exchanging with other provinces is secondary." A 27 May NCNA item on achievements of small industry in Tsinghai took a less parochial line, noting that industrial products including ball bearings, electric motors, pumps, and tractors are being turned out in sufficient supply "not only to meet the requirements in the province but also to supply them to fraternal provinces and areas."

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